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Abstract
The question of under what conditions conceptual rep-
resentation is compositional remains debatable within
cognitive science. This paper proposes a well devel-
oped mathematical apparatus for a probabilistic rep-
resentation of concepts, drawing upon methods devel-
oped in quantum theory to propose a formal test that
can determine whether a specic conceptual combina-
tion is compositional, or not. This test examines a joint
probability distribution modeling the combination, ask-
ing whether or not it is factorizable. Empirical studies
indicate that some combinations should be considered
non-compositionally.
Keywords: conceptual representation; compositional-
ity; context; probabilistic tests
Conceptual Representation
Within cognitive science, the question of how to repre-
sent concepts is still being debated. Dierent positions
have been put forward (e.g. the prototype view, the ex-
emplar view, theory theory view), and Murphy (2002)
contrasts some of these positions. He asks which is most
supported by the various aspects of cognition related to
conceptual processing, but concludes somewhat disap-
pointingly, that \there is no clear, dominant winner".
Here, we take the position that it is possible to progress
by asking a broader question about the nature of con-
cepts; can they always be modeled compositionally? Or
do they sometimes take a non-compositional form?
Some arguments for compositionality center around
the systematicity and productivity of language; there are
innitely many expressions in natural language and yet
our cognitive resources are nite. Compositionality en-
sures that this innity of expressions can be processed,
as it allows an arbitrary expression to be understood
in terms of its constituent parts. Since composition-
ality is what explains systematicity and productivity,
Fodor (1998) claimed that concepts must be composi-
tional, however, this is at odds with prototypicality ef-
fects (Frixione & Lieto, [In Press]; Fodor, 1998). For
example, consider the by now well known conceptual
combination PET FISH. A \guppy" is not prototypical
PET, nor a prototypical FISH, and yet a \guppy" is a
very prototypical PET FISH (Hampton, 1997). There-
fore, the prototype of PET FISH cannot result from the
composition of the prototypes of PET and FISH, and
so the characterization of concepts in prototypical terms
is dicult to reconcile with compositionality (Hampton,
1997; Fodor, 1998). This supports a view put forward
by Weiskopf (2007) when he observed that conceptual
combinations are \highly recalcitrant to compositional
semantic analysis".
Here, we take a novel approach to this debate, by pro-
viding a mathematical test which determines whether
a conceptual combination can be considered composi-
tionally, or not. We start with a consideration of what
compositionality might mean probabilistically.
Probabilistic Models of Compositionality
Figure 1 represents a basic probabilistic scenario involv-
ing a `black box' composed of two proposed subsystems,
A and B. What would it mean if this system was de-
clared to be compositional? Acknowledging that it is the
experiments which can be performed upon this system
(and their likely outcomes) that will dene this notion
allows us to move beyond philosophy and into the realms
of a mathematical denition.
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Figure 1: A potentially compositional system, consisting
of two identiable sub-components A and B. The system
can perhaps be understood in terms of a mutually exclu-
sive choice of experiments upon those sub-components,
one represented by the random variables A1;A2 (per-
taining to an interaction between the experimenter and
component A), and the other by B1;B2 (pertaining to
an interaction between the experimenter and component
B). Each of these experiments can return a value of 1,
representing yes and no.
We dene a compositional system as one which can
be validly decomposed in such a manner that dierent
experiments can be carried out upon each of its sub-
systems, and that these will answer a set of `questions'
regardless of the experimental behavior of any other sub-
systems. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that
the answers to these questions are binary, they might be
termed `yes' and `no', but are for generality labeled as +1
and  1.1 Standard probabilistic reasoning suggests that
1This assumption is more reasonable than it might at rst
appear: it is always possible to break a complex question
into a set of simple binary questions, as the popular game
it is possible to describe this behavior in terms of four
random variables representing the bivalent outcomes:
fA1;A2;B1;B2g. What analysis can be brought to
bear upon such a situation? As with many systems, the
outcomes of our experiments will have a statistical dis-
tribution over all available outcomes, and it is possible
to develop a set of probabilistic arguments about this
scenario. For example, it is possible to consider the joint
probability Pr(A1;A2;B1;B2) describing the likely be-
havior of our experimental black box, however, this very
formulation forces us to consider what exactly a non-
compositional probability distribution would look like.
This paper is devoted to answering this question, but
in order to approach the answer, we must rst provide a
model of non-compositional behavior, and this is not an
easy task; almost all of our mathematical formalisms are
based upon a notion of compositionality (Kitto, 2008).
However, one mathematical model is widely accepted as
non-compositional, Quantum Theory (QT), and so we
take this formalism as the basis of our formulation of
non-compositional behavior. Our reasons for this choice
will become clearer from a psychological perspective as
our argument progresses.
Senses and Concepts
Our model takes Gardenfors (2000) conceptual space as
its starting point, extending this notion through the use
of a vector space representation of concepts. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we shall construct this representation
through reference to the word association networks and
vocabulary of the human mental lexicon, although this
is not a necessary step for the formalism proposed; any
sensible vector space construct would suce if it has a
similar structure to that discussed below. The Univer-
Associate Probability
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Figure 2: The free association data for two words, (a)
bat, and (b) boxer. Both cases show a clear division
of each concept into a sport sense (highlighted in bold),
and an animal sense.
sity of South Florida (USF) word association data maps
the strength of word associations displayed by a large
sample of psychology students over a period of 30 years
of 20 questions illustrates. Quantum theory has provided
a more sophisticated proof of this result using the Spectral
Decomposition Theorem (Isham, 1995).
(Nelson et al., 2004). In Figure 2 we see a set of as-
sociation strengths for two words, \boxer" and \bat".
Note the manner in which both words can be attributed
a meaning that belongs to one of two senses; an ani-
mal sense and a sporting sense. Thus, we claim that the
concepts BOXER and BAT are both ambiguous. De-
spite this ambiguity, humans are adept at recognizing
the sense that is intended for an ambiguous word. They
do this through reference to the context in which the
word is being used, and this context might depend upon
a wide range of factors (e.g. the co-occurrence of other
words spoken before and after, the history of a conversa-
tion, the social context of the speaker). We note at this
point that even our simple scenario has far more am-
biguity than has appeared in the USF data (e.g. some
people would interpret boxer as a pair of shorts, and
someone could bat their eyes etc.), indeed, there are a
wide range of very ne gradations in meaning that might
be attributed to even these simple concepts. This added
complexity can be dealt with in our model through an
extension of the state space to higher dimensions, and
through the use of a more sophisticated set of data2 to
construct the vector space model that we shall present.
In the next section we shall show that it is possible
to construct a simple model of this ambiguity and its
contextual dependency through use of the quantum for-
malism.
A Quantum-Like Model of Word
Associations
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Figure 3: (a) A concept w, for example bat, is repre-
sented in some context c which takes the form of a basis
fj0i; j1ig. (b) Changing the cue might change the chance
of recall.
A simple model of the manner in which context might
aect the interpretation that a subject ascribes to an
ambiguous word can be constructed through the use of
a superposition state, which is a novel concept of a state
arising in Quantum Theory (QT). In Figure 3(a), an am-
biguous word w is represented in some context c, as a
superposition of recalled, j1i and not recalled j0i within
the mind of a subject. When presented with a cue (rep-
2Such as the one being collected here:
http://www.smallworldofwords.com
resented by the context c) the subject might return word
w, or not, with some probability. These probabilities can
be estimated through reference to the online USF data,3
which, in the context of a cue word \ball" suggests that
a subject will recall the concept BAT with a probabil-
ity Pr(BAT jball) = :19, or they might recall something
else (Pr(BAT jball) = :81). We put this data into the
quantum superposition state of Fig. 3(a) and so repre-
sent the cognitive state of our subject in the context of
being presented the cue word \ball" as
jBAT iball =
p
0:81j0iball +
p
0:19j1iball: (1)
Figure 3(a) represents these probabilites geometrically
using the measurement postulate of QT (Laloe, 2001;
Isham, 1995), but this same state can be easily obtained
through use of the Pythagorean theorem.
This simple model is made more interesting in Fig-
ure 3(b), where we have represented the fact that a dif-
ferent context (in this case a cue, but context could be
a more complex semantic component) might result in
a dierent set of recall probabilities. Thus, we could
represent BAT as the superposition in the cognitive
state of a subject when presented with the cue \cave":p
0:94j0i+p0:06j1i so giving a 6% probability that the
word \bat" will be recalled by a subject who is presented
with this dierent cue (or context). We see that the word
\bat" is more likely to be retrieved from memory when
a subject is presented with the cue \ball" than the cue
word \cave", and this change in probability can be ob-
tained from the same initial cognitive state through a
shift (i.e. a rotation) in the basis vectors representing
the context in gure 3(b).
How should we consider the combination of two words
in this model? While it is possible that a simple ten-
sor multiplication of the two superposition vectors might
suce, this is not necessarily the correct mechanism
(Bruza et al., 2009). Indeed, it seems possible that not
all senses of a word remain accessible during conceptual
combination. Thus, it might prove to be the case that a
BOXER BAT is only ever interpreted by human subjects
as \a small furry mammal with boxing gloves on", or \a
toy bat that a boxer dog chews on", which would imply
a case of perfect anti-correlation in the senses attributed
by a subject to the combination. That is, considering
the interpretation of the novel (i.e. non-lexicalized) con-
ceptual combination BOXER BAT in the context of two
priming conditions, one applied to each of the concepts
in the combination (e.g. BOXER primed by \dog" and
BAT by \ball") we denote a concept which is recalled
with the same sense as that for which it was primed as
1 and a failure to return in this sense by 0. For this sce-
nario we might nd that not all possible combinations of
3These numbers are obtained by nding the value
for \bat" in the \cave" matrix that is depicted at
http://web.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/AppendixC/ .
the two senses in the combination can be realized. For
example, we might nd that a subject's cognitive repre-
sentation of BOXER BAT should be represented as
jBOXERijBAT i = aj01i+bj10i; where jaj2+jbj2 = 1:
(2)
denoting a scenario where either BOXER has a sporting
sense and BAT an animal sense (j01i with probability
jaj2), or BOXER an animal sense and BAT a sporting
sense (j10i with probability jbj2).
Such a cognitive state has profound consequences for
the notion of compositionality. Indeed, QT has consis-
tently shown that similar states cannot be interpreted
compositionally (Isham, 1995; Laloe, 2001). Thus, if a
similar set of experiments can be found that apply to
human language processing, then this would give strong
support for the claim that language cannot always be
considered compositionally. The remainder of this pa-
per will briey sketch out recent work which attempts
to test for such non-compositional conceptual behavior
(Kitto et al., 2010, 2011; Bruza et al., 2012).
Tests of (Non-)Compositionality
QT has a well developed suite of tests that can be applied
to systems of the form shown in Figure 1, and these can
be quickly adapted towards the the analysis of composi-
tionality in language. For example, it is possible to con-
struct a variation of the Clauser{Horne{Shimony{Holt
(CHSH) inequality (Isham, 1995; Laloe, 2001), using an
analysis derived from Cereceda (2000), which tells us
that a system of this form can only be described as a
combination of it's subcomponents if:
2   = j2(Pr(A1 = +1;B1 = +1)
+ Pr(A1 =  1;B1 =  1) + Pr(A1 = +1;B2 = +1)
+ Pr(A1 =  1;B2 =  1) + Pr(A2 = +1;B1 = +1)
+ Pr(A2 =  1;B1 =  1) + Pr(A2 = +1;B2 =  1)
+ Pr(A2 =  1;B2 = +1)  2)j (3)
This formula (and a number of variations of it) has a sub-
stantial history in the physics and philosophy literature
(Laloe, 2001; Shimony, 1984), and lack of space prevents
a detailed explanation, however, we can briey motivate
its usage through a discussion of gure 1 and of the po-
tentially compositional nature of the system it describes.
Each subsystem A and B is represented by random vari-
ables: fA1;A2g and fB1;B2g, denoting whether a par-
ticular sense was observed (+1), or not ( 1) under a
given experimental arrangement. For this system, com-
positionality is expressed in terms of a factorizable proba-
bility distribution: Pr(A;B) = Pr(A) Pr(B). The syntax
of this equation clearly shows how the model of the com-
bined system is assumed to be expressed a product of the
distributions corresponding to the individual subsystems
A and B. When the inequality in (3) is violated, such a
compositionality assumption does not hold. Thus, the 
value in (3) gives us a clear criterion for deciding whether
a given concept combination should be considered com-
positional or not. In a set of recent work (Kitto et al.,
2010, 2011; Bruza et al., 2012), we have performed a
number of experiments aimed at testing our formulation
of the compositional hypothesis, and we shall now briey
discuss these results.
Empirical Evaluation
We utilized four dierent priming regimes in order to
generate the four dierent experimental scenarios re-
quired by Fig. 1. These experiments start by biasing
subjects towards a particular interpretation of a non-
lexicalized conceptual combination through exposure to
words that have a particular sense representing the un-
derlying concept. They then ask subjects to interpret
the conceptual combination, and to designate the senses
that they used in that interpretation. If conceptual com-
binations such as BOXER BAT are genuinely composi-
tional, then it seems reasonable to assume that \vam-
pire" primes BAT but has no priming eect on BOXER.
A probabilistic analysis using (3) was performed upon
the data obtained to test this assumption.
Table 1 lists the set of ambiguous conceptual combina-
tions chosen, as well as the primes used to bias subjects
towards each of two senses for the respective concepts.
Primes were selected from the USF norms (Nelson et al.,
2004) and the trials were composed of six phases.
Phases 1-2: Two consecutive double lexical decision
tasks were carried out, where participants were asked to
decide as quickly as possible whether two strings, a prime
and the concept to be presented as a part of the com-
pound given in Phase 3, were legitimate words, or if one
of the strings was a non-word. Participants responded
by pushing a button on the keyboard, labeled `word'
or a button labeled `non-word' (left arrow and right ar-
row keys respectively). For instance, if given the strings
\coil" and \spring", then participants were expected to
decide that both strings are words and so push the `word'
key, whereas if given \grod" and \church" then par-
ticipants were expected to decide that they had been
shown a non-word combination and to push the `non-
word' key. Each lexical decision consisted of the the two
letter strings presented in the center of screen, one below
the other. They were presented in this arrangement to
discourage participants from interpreting the two words
as a phrase. As soon as the participant responded, the
screen was replaced by a blank screen for 800 ms, which
was then immediately followed by the second lexical deci-
sion phase. The participant's second lexical decision was
followed by a 800 ms blank screen, and then immediately
followed by phase 3. For example, one lexical decision
task exhibited \coil" and \spring", and was designed to
prime the mechanical sense of the concept SPRING in
the conceptual combination SPRING PLANT. The or-
der of the two double lexical decision tasks was counter-
balanced, so that half were presented in the same or-
der as the compound words (e.g., \coil" and \spring"
are rst presented, then \factory" and \plant") and half
were presented in the reverse order (e.g., rst \factory"
and \plant" are presented for lexical decision, followed
by \coil" and \spring". Phase 3: A bi-ambiguous con-
ceptual combination was presented in the center of the
screen (e.g. \spring plant"). Participants were asked to
push the space bar as soon as they thought of an in-
terpretation for the compound. Filler compounds were
included for the ller (i.e. non-word) trials so as not
to disrupt the participant's rhythm in making two lex-
ical decisions followed by an interpretation. Phase 4:
Participants were asked to type in a description of their
interpretation. Phases 5-6: Two disambiguation tasks
were carried out, where participants choose what sense
they gave to each word from a list (e.g., plant = A.
`a living thing'; B. `a factory'; C. `other'). The order
of test and ller trials were randomized. Participants
completed 24 test trials and 24 ller trials, and the full
procedure took 20-30 minutes. Experimental subcom-
ponents utilizing non-words were discarded during the
analysis presented here.
Results
Table 1 lists a number of  values, some of which vio-
late equation (3). Condence intervals around the CHSH
value  were computed using the boostrap method that
both removed and added data points that corresponded
to interpretations that were either not present or added,
and for each iteration, a pseudo  was computed. Con-
dence intervals were computed using: mean(pseudo)
t0:975;n 1
p
var(pseudo)=n.
These results imply that there is good reason to be-
lieve that some conceptual combinations must be ana-
lyzed in a non-compositional framework. However, it is
still possible to provide further details about how exactly
the joint probability behaves during such a violation. In
what follows, we shall analyze three specic examples
from the three dierent categories of result: BOXER
BAT (where  < 2); APPLE CHIP (where  = 2); and
BANK LOG (where  > 2).
Further Analysis
It is possible to write the joint probability in a form
that starts to explain how violations of (3) occur. To
do this we represent the four dierent random variables
fA1;A2;B1;B2g in a matrix where each random vari-
able contribution is split into a set of possible outcomes.
This allows us to break down the results from Table 1
into a form that allows for a consideration of the under-
lying structure required for violations (or not) of (3). In
this representation we can write the data gathered from
the above experiments out as a set of joint distributions,
Concept A Concept B Results
Combination Prime 1(A1) Prime 2 (A2) Prime 3 (B1) Prime 4 (B2)  n
boxer bat dog ghter ball vampire 0.91 [0.74,1.09] 64
bank log money river journal tree 2.13 [2.01,2.32] 65
apple chip banana computer potato circuit 2 [1.82,2.06] 65
stock tick shares cow mark ea 2.15 [1.98,2.41] 64
seal pack walrus envelop leader suitcase 2.14 [2.01,2.32] 64
spring plant summer coil leaf factory 2.29 [2.18,2.48] 64
poker spade card re ace shovel 2.15 [2.05,2.33] 65
slug duck snail punch quack dodge 1.41 [1.20,1.55] 63
club bar member golf pub handle 2.28 [2.17,2.46] 64
web bug spider internet beetle computer 2 [1.82,2.06] 63
table le chair chart nail folder 0.38 [0.24,0.50] 63
match bowl ame contest disk throw 2.21 [2.06,2.43] 64
net cap gain volleyball limit hat 2.17 [2.04,2.39] 65
stag yarn party deer story wool 2.24 [2.08,2.36] 61
mole pen dig face pig ink 1.44 [1.29,1.60] 63
battery charge car assault volt prosecute 2 [1.81,2.07] 63
count watch number dracula time look 1.54 [1.39,1.64] 65
bill scale phone pelican weight sh 1.77 [1.56,1.97] 64
rock strike stone music hit union 2.01 [1.84,2.18] 64
port vessel harbour wine ship bottle 1.53 [1.38,1.61] 65
crane hatch lift bird door egg 2.05 [1.89,2.24] 63
toast gag jam speech choke joke 1.23 [1.08,1.36] 63
star suit moon movie vest law 1.68 [1.50,1.84] 62
fan post football cool mail light 2.13 [2.02,2.32] 63
Table 1: Results of the CHSH analysis:  denotes the CHSH value with an associated condence interval ( = 0:05),
n the number of subjects. Conceptual combinations that signicantly violate the CHSH inequality are bolded.
which allows for a further understanding of the resulting
behavior.
For example, under this analysis, the joint probability
of BOXER BAT can be written as (Bruza et al., 2012):
b
ox
er
A1
(dog)
+1
 1
A2
(fighter)
+1
 1
bat
B1(ball)
+1  1
B2(vampire)
+1  10BB@
0:43 0
0:28 0:28
0:1 0:2
0:1 0:6
0:13 0
0:33 0:53
0:31 0:06
0:31 0:31
1CCA
(4)
Here, we see no particular ordering or patterns when we
compare equations (3) and (4). We can see that the data
gathered does not center the distribution in such a way
that it can violate the CHSH inequality.
In contrast, APPLE CHIP leads to a joint distribution
that has a far more interesting structure:
a
p
p
le
A1
(banana)
+1
 1
A2
(computer)
+1
 1
chip
B1(potato)
+1  1
B2(circuit)
+1  10BB@
1 0
0 0
0:73 0
0 0:27
0:69 0
0 0:31
0:53 0
0 0:47
1CCA
(5)
In this case, we see a complete correlation between the
subject responses. Thus, whenever a subject interprets
APPLE as a fruit they decide that CHIP is a food, and
when APPLE is interpreted as a computer then CHIP is
interpreted as an electronic device. This complete corre-
lation of the senses attributed to the bi-ambiguous words
leads to a value of  = 2. This is still a compositional
concept combination.
Finally, if we consider conceptual combination BANK
LOG then we can see how a non-compositional value of
 > 2 is obtained:
b
a
n
k
A1
(money)
+1
 1
A2
(river)
+1
 1
log
B1(journal)
+1  1
B2(tree)
+1  10BB@
0:94 0
0 0:06
0:53 0
0:07 0:4
0:21 0
0:03 0:76
0:8 0:13
0 0:07
1CCA
(6)
While this case is similar to the one illustrated in (5),
it exhibits a key dierence; a non-zero value has been
returned by the ensemble of subjects for the o-diagonal
case where Pr(A2 = +1;B1 =  1) = 0:13, which cor-
responds to the case where the subjects interpret \bank
log" as e.g. a nancial institution made of wood. The
o-diagonal term in (3) means that there is enough prob-
ability `mass' for a violation. Comparing (4{6) with the
set of equations typied by (3) we can understand that
while it is necessary to for a system violating such in-
equalities to have some correlation in the random vari-
ables, it is just as important to have an anti-correlation.
Conclusions
There is nothing in equation (3) that restricts its do-
main of application to quantum theory. Indeed, there
are many systems that appear to be separated in a sim-
ilar way, and so should adhere to the probabilistic be-
havior that it requires. Indeed, an early work by Aerts
et al. (2000) proposed that the formalism of quantum
theory could be widely applied to the description of a
broad class of nonseparable systems, and this paper fur-
ther contributes to this stream of work. More recently
Busemeyer et al. (2011) have applied the formalism of
quantum theory to obtain a unied description of hu-
man decision making and the way in which it violates
many of the axioms of standard probability theory. To-
gether with the work presented here, these and many
other results suggest that the formalism of QT is widely
applicable to the analysis of psychological problems. We
suggest that this is due to the ability of the formalism to
incorporate a complex notion of context into its models,
a signicant advantage in cognitive modeling.
More specically, the work presented here has con-
sidered only two possible senses for each word, and a
very simple priming procedure, but we claim that this is
not a limitation of the model per se. Firstly, the spec-
tral decomposition theorem (Isham, 1995) implies that
any measurement can be decomposed into a sum of pro-
jection operators. Secondly, more complex primes and
cues can possibly be modeled through the use of a vector
space approach that extracts the meaning of proceeding
sentences, phrases and part word cues.
In summary, it seems likely that a broad class of
systems which exhibit strong contextual dependencies
among their subcomponents can be well modeled in this
approach, and future work will seek to further clarify
the conditions under which such systems become non-
compositional.
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